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CHAPTER THREE

Presidential Rhetoric
and the Federal Reserve

“I thought I was the president, but when it comes to these bureaucrats,
I can’t do a damn thing.”
—Harry S. Truman (Nathan, 1983)

The President and the Federal Reserve
Presidential administrations are highly concerned with what the Federal
Reserve (Fed) does (Cohen and Hamman, 2003). This independent bureaucratic agency, created in 1913, is charged with being the central bank of the
United States; it is supposed to maximize employment, moderate long-term
interest rates, set monetary policy, and manage inflation by raising and/or
lowering interest rates on monies loaned to banks, which substantially affects
the overall economy (Dolan, Frendreis, and Tatalovich, 2008; Morris, 2000;
Morris and Munger, 1998; Frumkin, 2004; Auerbach, 1985; Krause, 1994;
Shull, 2005). Therefore, presidents have been trying to garner influence with
the Fed since its inception (Worsham, 1997).
As many presidents do, Nixon often talked about the proper balance between inflation and unemployment and the Federal Reserve’s role in bringing about what is necessary for a healthy economy, particularly the Federal
Funds Rate (FFR), which when raised or lowered can stave off inflation or a
recession. President Nixon went to great lengths to influence the decisions
and monetary policy of the Fed during his chairmanship. In fact, Arthur F.
Burns was nominated, in part, because it was thought that he would listen to
29
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Nixon and follow monetary policy directions from the administration. President Nixon, at the swearing in of the Federal Reserve Chairman Burns, said
“I do have the opportunity as president to convey my views to the chairman
of the Federal Reserve.” Moreover, the president indicated that he had “some
very strong views on some of [the] economic matters . . .” and that he could
“assure . . . that [he would] convey them privately and strongly to Dr. Burns.”
He continued by saying that he “hope[ed] that independently [Dr. Burns
would] conclude that [President Nixon’s] views are the ones that should be
followed” (Woolley and Peters, 2014—“Richard Nixon, 1970”).
President Nixon never tried to hide or mask his attempts to “influence”
the independent agency in its decisions pertaining to the direction of monetary policy. Nixon is known to have said to Arthur Burns, “I know there’s the
myth of the autonomous Fed . . . and when you go up for confirmation some
Senator may ask you about your friendship with the president. Appearances
are going to be important” (Abrams, 2006). There are numerous recorded
conversations that illustrate Nixon’s attempts to influence the Chairman
and the Agency. The following are quotes from Abrams (2006):
October 23, 1969
My relations with the Fed, will be different than they were with [previous
Federal Reserve chairman] Bill Martin there. He was always six months too
late doing anything. I’m counting on you, Arthur, to keep us out of a recession.
October 10, 1971
I don’t want to go out of town [losing the presidential election] fast . . . this
will be the last Conservative administration in Washington.
December 24, 1971
Do you feel, as far as Arthur [Federal Reserve chairman] and the money supply,
we got that about as far as we can turn it right now, have we? I mean as far as
my influence on him, that’s what I’m really asking.
February 14, 1972
War is going to be declared if he [Chairman Arthur Burns] doesn’t come
around some.
February 14, 1972
I don’t much, I really don’t care what you [Arthur Burns] do in April, but
between now and April . . . that can hurt us . . . in November.

Abrams (2006) indicates, however, from recorded conversations between
President Nixon and George Shultz (Director of OMB), that the White
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House received a firm commitment from Chairman Burns to expand monetary policy.
The speculation that Nixon was able to exert influence over the Federal
Reserve and get them to acquiesce to an expansionary monetary policy and
agenda seems to have a semblance of legitimacy. The accusations abounded
during Arthur F. Burns tenure as Federal Reserve Chairman, suggesting the
Fed followed the directions and pressures from the president. According
to William Safire, Nixon’s speechwriter, the pressures extended to leaking
negative newspaper stories about Burns’s personal life so that he would toe
the line (Abrams, 2006). Moreover, there were threats to change the number
of members on the Fed’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). This
would have given Nixon an opportunity to change the “majority,” which
would have given him more leverage to expand credit and the money supply
(Abrams, 2006).
A few Nixon Administration officials stated that the chairman had the
FFR changed, as a result of the pressure, to facilitate in the advancement of
President Nixon’s agenda and reelection. Chairman Burns is recorded as saying, in multiple instances, “I wanted you [President Nixon] to know that we
lowered the discount rate . . . got it down to 4.5 percent” (Abrams, 2006).
Again, he tells the President that the FOMC was put “on notice that through
this action that [he] want[s] more aggressive steps taken by [the] committee
on next Tuesday”—indicating that he is following President Nixon’s directions (Abrams, 2006). Abrams (2006) says, “the economic data supports the
view that the Federal Reserve had already become decidedly more expansionary as Burns had promised.”
After the 1972 election and later when President Nixon had resigned,
the economy progressively soured, inflation reached over 12 percent and a
recession followed (Abrams, 2006; Bartlett, 2004). Many blamed Chairman
Burns for the declining economy; he was an esteemed economist and had to
be aware of the economic consequences of expanding the monetary policy.
Abrams (2006) says,
Without invoking political pressure, the surge of expansionary monetary
policy leading up to the 1972 election seems hard to explain. After all, Arthur
Burns knew better than to run a heavily expansive monetary policy after the
recession had ended in November 1970 and in an already-inflationary environment.

Nevertheless, a researcher can never fully ascertain if Chairman Burns succumbed to the pressure from President Nixon, aside from him stating clearly
that he did. Chairman Burns was highly intelligent and understood the
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economy; he simply could have done what he thought was the right thing
to do in terms of economic policy. Despite his intelligence and economic
skills, his actions could have been incorrect. Moreover, the phone conversations could easily be explained by saying that Chairman Burns was telling
the president what he wanted to hear while on the phone and then pursuing
what he thought was the best course of action at the Fed. There are other
conversations wherein President Nixon emphatically expresses his distrust
of Burns and others wherein Burns expresses his ideals for economic policy
to Nixon. As a matter of fact, however, the Federal Funds Rate did change
during the time in question.
Arthur Burns joined the Federal Reserve on February 1, 1971, during a
time when the Federal Funds Rate (FFR) was steadily decreasing, beginning
the process of expanding the amount of money available and keeping inflation down. Expanding the amount of money was directly in line with what
Nixon wanted, as he thought the Fed’s decision to contract the economy
precluded his presidential victory in 1960 (Abrams, 2006). Nixon said prior
to the election in 1972,
Arthur Burns, in terms of monetary policy and in terms of fiscal policy, has
followed a course that I think is the most responsible and statesmanlike of any
chairman of the Federal Reserve in my memory. In other words, you have seen
an expansionary monetary policy, and that is one of the reasons we have had
an expansionary economy in the first six months of this year (Woolley and
Peters, 2014—“Richard Nixon, 1971”).

In that same speech, President Nixon may have shown his hand in a very
revealing manner when he said, “So we find that Burns agrees—that I agree
with Burns, let’s put it that way. I agree with Burns very strongly on his
monetary policy, on his fiscal policy” (Woolley and Peters, 2014—“Richard
Nixon, 1971”).
History is riddled with instances, anecdotal however, wherein the decisions of the Federal Reserve have mirrored the wishes of the sitting president.
Given the Federal Reserve’s noted independence from political control,
whether the president influenced the Fed is noteworthy, given our understanding and commitment to separated institutions sharing power. Nixon’s
comments and Chairman Burns’ decisions warrant further and more comprehensive inquiry into whether or not Arthur Burns used his position as chairman of the Federal Reserve to get the FOMC to change the Federal Funds
Rate and the direction of monetary policy, at the expense of the economic
health of the United States, to aid in Nixon’s reelection.
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The following chapter offers a quantitative explanation regarding presidential influence with one of the most significant economic actors. How
can the president assert influence over one incredibly important aspect of
the economy if he cannot even get the economic actor to listen to him?
The findings serve to highlight the glaring flaw in the prevailing argument
that presidential rhetoric matters in the sense that it can persuade or influence—as the most important economic actors are not even paying attention
to what the president is saying. The findings provide a contribution to the
contentious discussion in the literature on presidential relations with the
Federal Reserve regarding the president’s capacity to influence monetary
policy (Krause, 1994; Havrilesky, 1995; Beck, 1982; Morris, 2000; Nathan,
1983; Wood and Waterman, 1994; Weintraub, 1978; Maisel, 1973).
Nevertheless, I consider the literature regarding the limitations presidential appointments to the Federal Reserve Board have and address how presidential rhetoric factors into the Fed’s decision-making regarding monetary
policy. From ascertaining the overall ineffectiveness of presidential rhetoric
and signals to the Fed, I posit a theory and empirical model that suggests the
Federal Reserve is more responsive to Congress and current economic conditions when making monetary policy decisions.

Garnering Influence with the Federal Reserve
In order to gain influence over the economy, particularly monetary policy,
presidents often try to put pressure on the Federal Reserve, using every mechanism their office and institution afford to them (Howell, 2003; Havrilesky,
1995). Presidents typically try to shape the Fed with appointments to the
seven-member Board of Governors. Moreover, presidents often use cues and
signals to the Fed to indicate what direction they want them to take monetary policy. Typically, the cues consist of changes in fiscal policy and calls
for the Fed to address inflation or unemployment, areas that substantively
impact the economy.
Historically, there is a desire for presidents to influence the Fed; however,
there is considerable disagreement about the extent to which the influence
is successful or effective (Krause, 1994; Havrilesky, 1995; Beck, 1982; Morris,
2000; Auerbach, 1985; Nathan, 1983; Wood and Waterman, 1994; Weintraub, 1978; Maisel, 1973). According to many scholars, presidents have
struggled to garner influence with the Fed, partly because it is an independent agency (Chappell, Havrilesky, and McGregor, 1993; Havrilesky, 1995;
Wood and Waterman, 1994; Morris, 2000; Cohen and Hamman, 2005;
Munger and Roberts, 1990). For instance, the discretion by the Fed, where
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their localities lie, and to whom they are accountable are all factors that keep
scholars continually trying to model this relationship and ascertain insight
into who is able to pressure the Fed and their monetary policy decisionmaking (Brehm and Gates, 1997)?
Appointments
Presidents attempt to use appointments to shape the monetary policy decisions at the Federal Reserve (Krause, 1994; Beck, 1982; Dolan, Frendreis,
and Tatalovich, 2008). There is a vast literature claiming presidents are
effective at doing this (Golden, 2000; Chappell, Havrilesky, and McGregor,
1993; Havrilesky and Gildea, 1992; Havrilesky, 1995; Nathan, 1983; Waterman, 1989; Wood and Waterman, 1994). There are still substantive gaps,
however, in the arguments, which have not done a satisfactory job of explaining the presidential influence with the Fed empirically and comprehensively (Munger and Roberts, 1990). There seems to be an assumption that
presidents are able to influence monetary policy with their appointments
(Auerbach, 1985; Hibbs, 1987; Weintraub, 1978; Maisel, 1973).
The decisions that the Fed makes can sabotage or undermine the policy
goals of the presidents (Brehm and Gates, 1997). In addition, the structure
of the relationship allows the Fed to achieve agency-oriented goals, which
are purely self-interested (Downs, 1967). This means that the requests
that come from the president are not precisely what will be pursued and
implemented at the Fed. Moreover, even though it features a seven-member
board of governors, appointed by the president, there is no guarantee that
the appointees will remain loyal to the policies of the president (Edwards
and Wayne, 1985). Many appointees in bureaucratic agencies “go native”
once they are immersed in the agency culture and begin advocating for the
plans of the agency rather than those of the president who appointed them
(DiClerico, 2000).
While, such a statement is somewhat true, one has to consider the subtleties of the appointment process to obtain a more accurate picture of the
degree to which appointments empower presidents to shape monetary policy
(Keech and Morris, 1997). Upon further inquiry, the realities of presidential
influence at the Fed are significantly less potent than commonly assumed
(Keech and Morris, 1997).
Chappell, Havrilesky, and McGregor (1993), as discussed in Keech and
Morris (1997), argue that Democratic presidents, more than Republican
presidents, typically appoint those members who prefer lower interest rates.
This fact, they claim, enables presidents to “pack” the Fed with like-minded
persons who will then change Fed monetary policy. The reality, however, is
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that presidents have not enjoyed the opportunity to appoint majorities to the
Fed board of governors very often (Keech and Morris, 1997). As illustrated
by table 3.1, presidents spend most of their time in office, in fact, before they
are able to make enough appointments to have a majority at the Fed.
To further complicate the “packing” argument, presidents must contend
with the “Earl Warren Effect” when making appointments to the Federal Reserve—namely appointees completely follow a different policy path than the
one desired by the appointing president (Morris, 2000, p. 73). Havrilesky and
Table 3.1.

Presidential Appointments to the Board of Governors.
Membership the Federal Reserve System (1953–2012)

D. D. Eisenhower
1953–1961
J. F. Kennedy
1961–1963
L. B. Johnson
1963–1969
R. M. Nixon
1969–1974
G. R. Ford
1974–1977
J. E. Carter
1977–1981
R. W. Reagan
1981–1989
G. H. W. Bush
1989–1993
W. J. Clinton
1993–2001
G. W. Bush
2001–2009

B. H. Obama
2009–
[AU Query 5]

Wm. McC. Martin, Jr. 1956 –1970
C. Canby Balderston 1954–1966
Chas. N. Shepardson 1955–1967
George W. Mitchell 1961–1976

A.L. Mills, Jr. 1958–1965
Paul E. Miller 1954–1954
G.H. King, Jr. 1959–1963

J. Dewey Daane 1963–1974
Andrew F. Brimmer 1966–1974
Arthur Burns 1970–1978
Jeffrey M. Bucher 1972–1976
Henry C. Wallich 1974–1986
Philip E. Coldwell 1974–1980
J. Charles Partee 1976–1986
David M. Lilly 1976–1978
G. William Miller 1978–1979
Emmett J. Rice 1979–1986
Paul A Volcker 1979–1987
Preston Martin 1982–1986
Wayne D. Angell 1986–1994
H. Robert Heller 1986–1989
Alan Greenspan 1987–2006
David W. Mullins, Jr. 1990–1994
Susan M. Phillips 1991–1998
Alan Greenspan 1987–2006
Janet L. Yellen 1994–1997
Alice M. Rivlin 1996–1999
Edward M. Gramlich 1997–2005
Roger W. Ferguson, Jr. 1997–2006
Mark W. Olson 2001–2006
Donald L. Kohn 2002–2010
Randall S. Kroszner 2006–2009
Elizabeth A. Duke 2008–2013
Daniel K. Tarullo 2009–
Janet L. Yellen 1994–1997
Jeremy C. Stein 2012–

Sherman J. Maisel 1965–1972
William W. Sherrill 1967–1971
John E. Sheehan 1972–1975
Robert C. Holland 1973–1976
Philip C. Jackson, Jr. 1975–1978
Stephen S. Gardner 1976–1978
Nancy H. Teeters 1978–1984
Frederick H. Schultz 1979–1982
Lyle E. Gramley 1980–1985
Martha R. Seger 1984–1991
Manuel H. Johnson 1986–1990
Edward W. Kelley, Jr. 1987–2001
John P. LaWare 1988–1995
Lawrence B. Lindsey 1991–1997
Alan S. Blinder 1994–1996
Laurence H. Meyer 1996–2002
Roger W. Ferguson, Jr. 1997–2006
Susan S. Bies 2001–2007
Ben S. Bernanke 2002–2006
Kevin M. Warsh 2006–2011
Frederic S. Mishkin 2006–2008
Sarah Bloom Raskin 2010–
Jerome H. Powell 2012–

Adapted from Federal Reserve Official Website, 2014.
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Gildea (1992) found that from 1951–1987 the presidential appointments to
the Fed’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) did not always vote for
the policy preferences of those presidents who appointed them.
Moreover, appointments to the Fed are similar to appointments to the
Supreme Court; there has to be agreement with the political, business, and
economic communities in order to secure a position on the Federal Reserve
Board (Beck, 1982). Divided government and election proximity keep partisan appointees from confirmation by the Senate (Waller, 1992). In fact,
many of the appointments are persons who have risen through the ranks at
the Fed; they are not politically partisan appointments from campaign staff,
but rather “experts” who have already been “institutionalized” at the Fed.
Just as important, presidential appointments do not provide any significant
level of influence over the Fed’s FOMC’s decision-making when compared to
the influence that takes place from within the Fed, particularly with regard to
consensus within the FOMC and the Fed chair (Krause, 1994). Presidential
appointments of the Chair of the Federal Reserve are not correlated with
significant changes in Fed monetary policy (Chang, 2001; Beck, 1987; Rose,
1991; Maisel, 1973; Nordhaus, 1975; Tufte, 1978; Krause, 1994). Moreover,
there is also no substantive evidence that appointments to the Fed’s FOMC
had any influence on policy either (Chang, 2001).
Where there is change in the predicted median influence, the data do not
tell us if the influence is coming from the president or the Senate, who may
be, and often are, at odds with one another (Chang, 2001). In the instances
where there were substantial changes to the Fed’s monetary policy, it is more
likely that the changes were a result of external pressures from Congress or
the changing/shifting world economy rather than a result of presidential appointments, policy preferences, or rhetorical cues from the president (Beck,
1982; Saeki and Shull, 2003).
Based upon the extant empirical literature, there is no theoretical justification to include appointments into the following statistical model. The
extant research does a thorough job refuting the notion that presidents can
influence monetary policy with appointments to the Federal Reserve. Nevertheless, I included this section to highlight the fact that even a concrete
power that the president has with the Federal Reserve does not grant him
influence over the agency or their decision-making. If the appointment
power does not afford presidents influence, the likelihood that rhetoric does
is even less probable.
Granted, one could argue that the Fed might pay attention to what the
president says and act accordingly with regard to the FFR when there is a
vacancy in the hopes that the president will appoint someone of which the
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Fed approves. However, I discuss this and the literature later. The president
is going to appoint someone that the Senate will confirm. Therefore, it is not
likely that the Fed would go against what Congress wants in an attempt to
get some shortsighted gain, because, in fact, the president is not really going
to go against what the Senate wants due to the fact that he knows the person
would not likely obtain confirmation anyway.
Rhetorical Cues and Signals
The president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, along with many of
his colleagues, believes that the stimulation needed to make the economy
better occurs by changing the way elite economic policymakers talk about
the best direction for the economy (Campbell, Evans, Fisher, and Justiniano,
2012). Given their position and the size of the president’s constituencies,
it seems to assert that presidents would be able to influence this particular
economic actor directly with cues and signals.
More importantly, there are instances where Fed chairmen have stated
that presidential requests and cues have changed the behavior of the Fed,
particularly during the Johnson Administration (see table 3.2). There are
also a few claims in the literature stating that the Fed has manipulated the
Federal Funds Rate (FFR) during elections to either help or hurt the incumbent president, as discussed earlier (Beck, 1987; Maisel, 1973; Nordhaus,
1975; Tufte, 1978). These claims were prevalent during the election of 1972.

Table 3.2.

Presidential Administrations and the Chairman of the Fed.
Federal Reserve System (1953–2012)

William McChesney Martin, Jr.
1951–1970
Arthur F. Burns
1970–1978
G. William Miller
1978–1979
Paul A. Volcker
1979–1987
Alan Greenspan
1987–2006
Ben Bernanke
2006–2014
Janet Yellen
2014–

Dwight D. Eisenhower
Lyndon B. Johnson
Gerald R. Ford

John F. Kennedy
Richard M. Nixon
James “Jimmy” E. Carter

James “Jimmy” E. Carter
Ronald W. Reagan
George H. W. Bush
George W. Bush
George W. Bush

William J. Clinton
Barack H. Obama

Barack H. Obama

Adapted from Federal Reserve Official Website, 2014.

14_247_Arthur.indb 37

5/27/14 5:23 AM

38

•

Chapter Three

Many of those supposedly involved either denied the accusations or recanted
later what had been said (Beck, 1982).
When controlling for the president and the Fed Chairman, however,
there is a statistical effect for changes in monetary policy (Havrilesky, 1995).
The response of monetary policy to signals does not continue for all presidents and chairmen; it only exists for certain periods. For instance, the FFR
changed when Arthur Burns was the chairman under presidents Nixon and
Ford, but not when it was William Martin. The same chairman with the
Carter Administration shows no influence. When President Carter switched
to Chairman Volcker, the monetary policy did react to the signals. This continued through the first Reagan Administration, but not the second. When
Chairman Greenspan took over, monetary policy responded to the signals
from President Reagan. This trend did not continue with President George
H. W. Bush and Chairman Greenspan. Interestingly, however, monetary
policy did respond to President Clinton’s signals when Chairman Greenspan was there. Monetary policy, briefly followed the direction of President
George W. Bush with Chairman Greenspan. Finally, there is no question
that monetary policy followed the direction President Obama desired while
Chairman Bernanke is at the helm, and seems to be currently following
Chairwoman Yellen.
These anecdotal examples, however, do not withstand statistical scrutiny,
such evidence has not been proven to be a comprehensive and systematic
statistical reality, but rather appears to be “episodic” with most such claims
unsubstantiated by empirical findings, however (Havrilesky, 1995, p. 37;
Beck, 1982).
However, there are a number of reasons why the president will use signals
as a mechanism of successful economic leadership to the Federal Reserve
(Wood, 2007; Eshbaugh-Soha, 2006). Informing the Fed of his policy preferences is the best, most effective way for the president to overcome the coalition building challenges as well as the vitriolic political process (DiClerico,
2000). The president wants to signal to the “policy elites” for what he is
willing to fight, such as a contractionary or expansionary monetary policy
and provide reassurances of how much commitment he has to his economic/
monetary policy (Eshbaugh-Soha, 2006; p. 7). This opportunity enables the
president to signal the economic groups and policymakers about how their
actions will be recompensed (Eshbaugh-Soha, 2005).
The prevailing theories and research states that the president’s ability to
employ rhetoric to shape the behavior of economic actors should be substantiated by the fact that the president is the foremost person with economic
information, which makes him the most visible figure in economic discus-
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sions (Wood, 2007; Eshbaugh-Soha, 2005). The fact that the president has
the largest staff of economic actors (National Economic Council, Council
of Economic Advisors, Office of Management and Budget, Department
of Treasury, Department of Commerce, Department of Labor, Bureau of
Economic Analysis) providing him with information and advice makes him
appear to be the preeminent economic policymaker. The expectation is that
the president, because of his access to comprehensive information, leads the
economy, particularly through downturns and prosperity, with rhetoric, signals, and cues (Wood, 2004). Should this unparalleled role give him a direct
influence over the economy? In other words, should the Fed be responsive to
his rhetoric, looking to him for direction, information, and leadership?
Presidents use rhetoric to assert their power and position. Thus, does it
make it an influential mechanism of presidential power? Sending positive
and negative signals to the Fed is the president’s way of conveying his policy
preferences (Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake, 2005; Eshbaugh-Soha, 2006). The
president hopes the economic speeches function as his mechanism of power,
an instrument of the modern presidency that conveys what he wants. He
hopes the signals put pressure on the Fed to act (Eshbaugh-Soha, 2006). Successfully influencing the Fed, however, is profoundly complicated because
they are independent so presidents have to rely on their ability to persuade
them to make decisions about complex and controversial policies: employment, prices, long-term interest rates, raising interest rates or lowering interest rates (Dolan, Frendreis, and Tatalovich, 2008; Krause, 1994; Havrilesky,
1995; Beck, 1982; Morris, 2000; Wood and Waterman, 1994; Weintraub,
1978; Maisel, 1973).
The Fed’s Response to Cues and Signals
The signals are, typically, verbal words or cues that presidents speak to the
policy elites. These signals can offer support for specific programs or they can
be expressions of their opposition to what the policy elites are actually doing.
Moreover, the signals can be specific such as requests for changes or actions
to an existing policy. As long as the president is informing the elites of his
preferences, what he is doing is a signal (Eshbaugh-Soha, 2006).
The cues and signals presidents use can be found in the literature on what
the Federal Reserve does economically, the attention it pays to unemployment, inflation, and the interest rates (Eshbaugh-Soha, 2006; Dolan, Frendreis, and Tatalovich, 2008). The most pertinent economic indicators, or
policy tools as the Fed calls them, help to make up the U.S. monetary policy,
which can make or break a president’s legacy, reelection, or image to the
“Washingtonians” (Havrilesky, 1995; Neustadt, 1991). Shaping monetary

14_247_Arthur.indb 39

5/27/14 5:23 AM

40

•

Chapter Three

policy is crucial for presidential success (Morris, 2000). The cues and signals
to the Fed ensure that the president is, in fact, trying to influence the behavior of this particular economic actor.
Should the Fed be receptive of the president’s signals because of cue taking; their rhetoric is a form of leadership signaling (Whitford and Yates,
2009)? Do the signals and cues to the Fed engender “cognitive shortcuts”
in relation to information that is pertinent to the agency (Eshbaugh-Soha,
2006, p. 38)? Elite policymakers have limited information about the political ramifications of most policy decisions. By listening to the president, are
the policy elites able to make effective decisions about policy because the
president fills in that information that is lacking, due to his vast network?
The prevailing theories suggests that presidential signals, consistent
speeches about the state of the economy, and the president’s policy preferences for the Fed inform the agency of the president’s positions and economic
goals (Eshbaugh-Soha, 2005). Using signals that address issues of concern to
the Fed, the president should be able to influence their decision-making.
The tone of the speeches filters through to the economic actors and should
be reflected in their economic behavior, which creates a consistent message
that can “establish a climate for economic perceptions” (Wood, 2007, p. 14).
This climate is something that the president can then manipulate or shape,
according to Wood (2007).
In order to measure whether the Fed is responsive to the signals of the
president, Havrilesky (1995) created a “SAFER index,” coding every mention in the Wall Street Journal that addressed monetary policy (expansionary
or contractionary) and some action mentioned by other members of the
president’s administration such as the Secretary of Treasury and the Council
of Economic Advisors (p. 118). He found no statistically significant impact
in the period 1964–1994, when controlling for the White House staff and
the CEA. The study only looked at one, fairly conservative, economic
newspaper, rather than a comprehensive timespan of presidential comments
(Woods and Arthur, 2014; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006). Moreover, it is fair
to assume that the Wall Street Journal is going to mention only those comments they find pertinent to the overall goals of their newspaper (EshbaughSoha and Peake, 2008).
Moreover, the Clinton Administration’s signals to the bond market did
not make a significant difference; there was no effect on the thirty-year Treasury Bills despite the rhetoric (Eshbaugh-Soha, 2005). President George H.
W. Bush’s signals to the market about the money supply in his State of the
Union Addresses were not effective (Eshbaugh-Soha, 2005). In fact, his signals returned the opposite outcomes. He does, however, find that there is an
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effect when he controls for the president and the FED chairman (Havrilesky,
1995). The response of monetary policy to signals does not continue for all
presidents and chairmen; it only exists for certain periods.
Such data and results suggest that the president has a limited influence
over economic and monetary policy (Eshbaugh-Soha, 2005). Moreover,
studies show that in the pre-golden (1953–1962), golden (1963–1985), and
the post-golden (1986–2002) age television eras, presidential rhetoric had
no significant effect on how the public viewed economic policy (Young and
Perkins, 2005). The research suggests that the presidents, through their rhetorical actions, are limited in their ability to influence economic effects or
economic indicators directly.
Scholarship really has no comprehensive evidence detailing the extent
to which presidents send signals to the Fed about economic policy, despite
a complex and growing literature on presidential signals to various actors,
and subsequently, no comprehensive evidence suggesting the extent to
which the Fed responds to the presidential rhetoric (Whitford and Yates,
2009; Wood, 2007). Therefore, assessing the Fed’s responsiveness to the
signals in a comprehensive analysis provides an important look into the
effectiveness of presidential rhetoric to shape economic and monetary
policy at the Fed. If positivity and/or negativity can predict changes in
the Federal Funds Rate, then one can confidently state that the presidents
have the ability to shape the economic behavior of the Fed. The following
model and hypotheses offer insight into the limitations the aforementioned
theory has regarding the president’s ability to influence the Fed with signals
and rhetoric.

Hypotheses for Predicting Changes in the Federal Funds Rate
The data gathered for this particular analysis show that presidents try to signal the Fed, however, based upon the political realities of their relationship
with the Fed and the limitations such a relationship imposes on the president, they struggle to do so effectively. The statistical model will offer results
that suggest the aggregated, positive economic rhetoric from the president is
unable to shape the behavior of the Fed, changes in the Federal Funds Rate
(FFR) (Dolan, Frendreis, and Tatalovich, 2008). The expectation is that
presidential rhetoric is not able to predict the probability that the Fed will
change the FFR.
H1O: The president’s positive economic rhetoric will predict the probability
that the Fed will change the FFR.
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H1A: The Fed will respond to the president’s positive economic rhetoric either
by leaving the FFR where it is or the Fed will lower the FFR.
H2O: The president’s negative economic rhetoric will predict the probability
that the Fed will lower the FFR.
H2A: The Fed will respond to the president’s negative economic rhetoric either
by leaving the FFR where it is or the Fed will raise the FFR.

Congressional Pressures on the Federal Reserve
Some have argued that the Fed is more likely to make decisions about monetary policy based upon external pressures from Congress rather than cues or
signals from the president (Saeki and Shull, 2003). Congress often requires
that members of the board of governors provide testimony before hearings
and particular committees about the economy and future economic conditions (Saeki and Shull, 2003). More specifically, the preferences of the Senate play a significant role in the Fed’s decision to adopt an expansionary or
a restrictive monetary policy (Morris, 2000). The senators are going to have
specific preferences based upon the preferences of their constituents and
their party-ideology (Saeki and Shull, 2003).
The Fed is less likely to choose a direction for monetary policy that would
encounter opposition in Congress, which has asserted its authority and
made transparency a major requirement due to the secrecy with which the
Fed conducted its monetary policy decision-making in the past (Havrilesky,
1995; Munger and Roberts, 1990). The Fed is now required to present, to
Congress, its thoughts regarding the Federal Funds Rate and the direction it
believes the economy is headed. The Fed acquiesced to these demands rather
than fighting; it feared how aggressively Congress would assert its authority
and how much autonomy they could potentially lose (Havrilesky, 1995).
The Fed responds to the policy preferences of Congress; they have the
most influence in the Fed’s role with monetary policy (Munger and Roberts,
1990; Havrilesky, 1995). More specifically, the Fed is going to pay significant attention to the Chairperson of the Senate Banking Committee when
considering whether they will expand or contract monetary policy, given the
power of this chairperson: autonomy, agenda-setting, and ability to call hearings, as well as the chairperson’s ability to withstand pressure to compromise
on their ideological predilections, unlike the president who has a national
constituency (Saeki and Shull, 2003). The Fed is more likely to make its decision about the economy based upon the preferences of the Senate Banking
Committee Chairperson rather than the president (Saeki and Shull, 2003).
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The prevailing thought, entrenched in the literature, is that Republicans
advocate for contractionary monetary policy (higher interest rates) and that
Democrats seek after expansionary monetary policy (lower interest rates),
as these approaches best favor their respective constituencies (Keech and
Morris, 1997; Hibbs, 1987; Havrilesky, 1995). In other words, the ideology
of the political parties plays a major role in the monetary policy the Fed
pursues (Hibbs, 1987). Particularly, the Senators are going to have specific
preferences based upon their constituents and the necessities of their reelection attempt (Saeki and Shull, 2003). This is overwhelmingly seen in the
fact that Democratic presidents typically appoint those members who prefer
lower interest rates more than Republican appointees (Chappell, Havrilesky,
and McGregor, 1993). This must be factored into the discussion given that
the Senate must confirm each of the appointees to the Federal Reserve’s
board of governors.
Congressional intervention into monetary policy mitigates the influence the president has over the Fed (Havrilesky, 1995). Congress exercises
a significant influence over the Federal Funds Rate when it communicates
its policy preferences in the biannual Congressional Oversight Hearings
on monetary policy (Havrilesky, 1995). Therefore, this analysis seeks to
determine if the Fed makes changes to the FFR, as a result of the political
party of the Chairperson of the Senate Banking Committee or the number
of hearings the Congress has regarding the economy, particularly since the
literature indicates that the Congress asserts institutional pressures on the
Fed regarding policy.
H3O: The political party of the chairperson of the Senate Banking Committee
will predict the type of economic policy the Fed will pursue in its decisions to
change the FFR.
H3A: The Fed will respond to the political party of the chairperson of the
Senate Banking Committee by leaving the FFR where it is or pursuing a contractionary or expansionary monetary policy with disregard to party ideology.
H4O: The number of congressional hearings regarding the economy will predict the probability that the Fed will alter its economic behavior and change
the FFR.
H4A: The Fed will respond to the number of congressional hearings regarding
the economy either by leaving the FFR where it is or pursuing a contractionary
or expansionary monetary policy with disregard to congressional attention to
the economy.
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The Federal Reserve’s Attention to Economic Conditions
Presidents have not addressed the economy in a major way in five of the last
eleven recessions. In fact, presidents speak more about non-economic-related
issues during a recession than economic issues (Hoffman and Howard, 2010).
They tend to offer fewer speeches during times of recession, inflation, and
low employment (Ragsdale, 1987). There is a reason for this: constructing
too dramatic a picture of the economy can have seriously negative effects for
the president. Moreover, presenting the economy as better than it actually
is or ignoring the realities makes the president seem out of touch or incompetent, both of which can affect his interaction with important political
actors or the electorate (Hoffman and Howard, 2010). They rarely, if ever,
make major economic speeches to inform the public how well the economy
is doing.
The state of the economy accounts for public perceptions of the effectiveness of political actors (Wood, 2007). According to Dolan, Frendreis, and
Tatalovich (2008), the public expects the government to keep the economy
feasible. Despite particular events of national importance, the economy,
specifically, unemployment and inflation, top Gallup’s “Most Important
Problem” every year since 1936. The economy is important to the public,
and they have substantively linked their perceptions of its condition to
their own personal political behavior. Downturns in the economy affect the
agenda, reelections, and public perceptions of the president. Moreover, the
president’s party typically loses congressional seats when the economy is not
satisfactory (Dolan, Frendreis, and Tatalovich, 2008).
As stated in the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, the Fed is supposed to
maximize employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates
(Dolan, Frendreis, and Tatalovich, 2008). This legislative mandate allows
the Fed to substantively affect inflation. Economic conditions must be considered a pertinent motivator for the Fed’s decisions to change the Federal
Funds Rate (Saeki and Shull, 2003). The Fed has a legislative responsibility
to pursue low unemployment and low inflation, which makes it more likely
to consider these rates when deciding whether to raise or lower the Federal
Funds Rate (Beck, 1982). These indicators can better explain the monetary
policy changes rather than the president’s cues, especially when you consider
the Fed’s institutional pride and legacy (Beck, 1982).
H5O: The Fed will respond to the changes in GDP (threats of recession) by
modifying the FFR to combat inflation and unemployment.
H5A: The Fed will use the FFR to pursue a contractionary or expansionary
monetary policy with disregard to the changes GDP.
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H6O: The Fed will respond to the changes in the inflation rate by modifying
the FFR to combat inflation and unemployment.
H6A: The Fed will use the FFR to pursue a contractionary or expansionary
monetary policy with disregard to the changes in the inflation rate.
H7O: The Fed will respond to the changes in the unemployment rate by modifying the FFR to combat inflation and unemployment.
H7A: The Fed will use the FFR to pursue a contractionary or expansionary
monetary policy with disregard to the changes in the unemployment rate.

Empirical Model
As per the hypotheses above, three models (M1 = the tone of presidential
rhetoric, M2 = congressional attention to the economy, and M3 = economic
indicators) were constructed to ascertain the conditions that can create
changes in the FFR.1 Using content analysis, the rhetorical cues and signals
the presidents sent to the Fed were coded according to a detailed protocol
and codebook, as discussed in chapter 1. The Policy Agendas Project data on
congressional hearings were manipulated to match this model. And, the
economic data were gathered from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
Each model allowed me to estimate the effects of these independent variables
on the FFR. The time series analysis was for every president from Dwight
D. Eisenhower (1954) through Barack H. Obama (2010), as illustrated by
figure 3.1. The unit of analysis was monthly for each model. For the regression analysis involving presidential rhetoric, I estimated two lags; each is a
month in duration. I chose to use a monthly lag because the dependent variable is estimated monthly. Moreover, I chose to use only two of these lags
because the literature justifies such an action. There are time limits on the
effectiveness and potency of presidential rhetoric (Whitford and Yates, 2009;
Edwards, 2009; Edwards, 2003). The policy window of any salient issue the
president is discussing has limits with regard to the attention span of political
actors and the public (Kingdon, 1995; Eshbaugh-Soha, 2006).
Statistical Method
As with many time series analyses, the Durbin-Watson statistical test in
the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression Analysis presented first-order
autocorrelation (AR1) in each model (d = 0.15 for M1, d = 0.22 for M2, and
d = 0.11 for M3) (Comiskey and Marsh, 2012; Yates and Whitford, 2005).
Based upon the diagnostics, using a Prais-Winston (1954) regression analysis
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Adapted from American Presidency Project, 2014.

Figure 3.1. Monthly Totals of Presidential Speeches 1954–January 2012.
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with the Cochrane–Orcutt estimation allowed me to more appropriately
estimate the changes in the Federal Funds Rate (Gronke and Miller, 2012;
Gerring, Thacker, and Moreno, 2005; Whitford and Ochs, 2005; Yates and
Whitford, 2005; Lowry and Shipan, 2002). Moreover, the variance inflation
factor (VIF) results indicated that there was no problem with multicollinearity in either of the models and I estimated the regressions with semi-robust
standard errors after re-specifying the model to mitigate any residual heterskedasticity. The model, overall, is in line with the hypotheses2; the predictor variables in this analysis do not significantly affect whether the Federal
Reserve changes its FFR as a result of the positivity and/or negativity in the
president’s economic rhetoric. However, as theorized, the results suggest that
the FFR does respond to congressional behavior and economic indicators.
Independent Variables
Presidential Economic Rhetoric (M1)
Identifying the presidential rhetoric aimed at the Federal Reserve was,
again, accomplished by using the Public Papers of the President in the American
Presidency Project, from July 1954 through January 19, 2012. This provided
the researcher with 1,530 presidential speeches. The population is measured
over sixty-five years (1946–2012). The presidential cues and signals to the
Federal Reserve were coded as the ratio of positive speeches to negative and
neutral speeches (positive ratio ((positive speeches)/(positive speeches +
negative speeches + neutral speeches)) and the ratio of negative speeches to
positive and neutral speeches (negative ratio ((negative speeches)/(negative
speeches + positive speeches + neutral speeches)). I created two, one-month
lags for each of these variables.
Coding the speeches as “positive” must be differentiated from the notion
of “optimism,” which is perpetually present in presidential economic rhetoric; they are the economy’s unremitting cheerleader. As illustrated by table
3.3, many of the positive mentions are presidential claims of moving the
economy towards positive economic growth, such as creating jobs, mitigating the effects of inflation, lessening the burden to tax payers, or economic
expansion. As shown by figures 3.4 and 3.5 later in the analysis, presidents
are generally more positive about the economy and do not often discuss the
“negative” economy.
For the first model (M1), I included more independent variables to help
control for the effects of each of the other independent variables that influence the dependent variable (FFR). I included the actual number of total
speeches given per month (1 to 78) in order to account for the amount of
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Table 3.3.

Example Sentences Measuring the Tone of Presidential Rhetoric.
Speeches from the American Presidency Project

D. D. Eisenhower
1/18/1960

J. F. Kennedy
1/24/1963
L. B. Johnson
1/26/1967

R. M. Nixon
8/15/1971

G. R. Ford
12/3/1974
J. E. Carter
1/21/1980

R. W. Reagan
1/11/1989
G. H. W. Bush
2/12/1991

W. J. Clinton
6/6/1997

G. W. Bush
5/22/2004
B. H. Obama
2/24/2011

This budget attests to the strength of America’s economy. At the
same time, the budget is a test of our resolve, as a nation,
to allocate our resources prudently, to maintain the Nation’s
security, and to extend economic growth into the future without
inflation.
The chief problem confronting our economy in 1963 is its
unrealized potential—slow growth, under-investment . . . and
persistent unemployment.
Interest rates in 1966 were as high as at any time in forty years.
They were pushed there by an insatiable demand for credit,
straining against a deliberately restricted supply. Monetary policy
in 1966—like tax policy—was properly aimed at slowing down
an economy expanding too fast.
The tax reductions I am recommending, together with this broad
upturn of the economy which has taken place in the first half
of this year, will move us strongly forward toward a goal this
Nation has not reached since 1956, fifteen years ago: prosperity
with full employment in peacetime.
Admittedly, the American economy is in a recession at the present
time. Inflation pressures are many. Fear of unemployment is
increasing among our people.
Inflation continues to be our most serious economic problem.
Restraining inflation remains my highest domestic priority.
Inflation at the current, unacceptably high levels is the direct
result of economic problems that have been building, virtually
without letup, for over a decade. There are no easy answers, or
quick solutions to inflation. It cannot be eliminated overnight; its
roots in our economy are too deep, its causes are too pervasive
and complex.
Our plans for the economy would cause inflation to soar and bring
about economic collapse.
These shocks hit an economy that was already growing slowly
for several reasons, including worldwide increases in interest
rates, tightened credit conditions, and the lingering effects of
a successful attempt begun in 1988 by the Federal Reserve to
prevent an acceleration of inflation . . . I know that in some
regions of our country, people are in genuine economic distress.
Today we received one more piece of solid evidence that this
invest-and-grow strategy is working. We learned that our
economy added 138,000 new jobs and that unemployment
dropped to 4.8 percent, the lowest in twenty-four years.
With the right policies, we will maintain the strong forward
momentum of the American economy, which is creating
thousands of new jobs for American workers.
The economy is now growing. In many sectors we’re seeing
recovery. But the biggest challenge that we’re seeing right now
is the fact that unemployment is still way too high all across the
country.

Adapted from American Presidency Project, 2014.
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attention the president is paying to the economy. To better account for the
attention, I broke the number of speeches down by tone and included the
number of negative speeches given per month (0 to 6) and the number of
positive speeches given per month (0 to 9). Using the number of monthly
presidential calls for legislation that deal with the economy (0 to 6) will
further measure the presidential attempts to shape the economy. In addition to presidential attempts at shaping the economy, the presidents’ party
affiliations (Democrat (1 = yes or 0 = no); Republican (1 = yes or 0 = no))
and their average approval ratings (expressed as a monthly percentage = 0 to
100 percent) complement the model and ensure that it is specified correctly.
Congressional Attention (M2)
The data at the Policy Agendas Project was used to assess congressional
behavior in the second model (M2). These data provide the number of total
congressional hearings on the economy and the number of Senate Banking
Committee hearings from the 79th Congress to the 110th Congress. From
this data, I was able to construct six independent variables that are pertinent
to the analysis. As evidenced by figure 3.2, I aggregated, monthly, the total
days of hearings on the economy to measure congressional attention to economic issues that are important to the Federal Reserve (0 to 57). Moreover, I
was able to ascertain the number of hearings the Senate Banking Committee
had regarding economic issues relating to the Federal Reserve’s responsibilities (0 to 15). I excluded those hearings on the economy that had to do with
appropriations and reauthorizations; including such elements will confuse
the data and the results (Edwards and Wood, 1999).
In addition to measuring congressional attention to the economy, considering the importance of party is necessary to measure the differences of
influence within the committees, particularly because majority parties have
more resources at their disposal to arrange committees and the shape the
agenda, as illustrated by figure 3.2 (Aldrich and Rohde, 2000). Moreover,
what matters are the preferences of individual members of Congress, particularly the median member; bills cannot garner institutional support until they
pass the majority in the House and the filibuster threat in the Senate (Brady
and Volden, 2006). Individuals, in a particular context, are able to derail
the direction of monetary policy; it is not the parties (Krehbiel, 1998). To
account for this, I created a dummy variable that measures the party of the
chairman of the Senate Banking Committee (Democrat (1 = yes or 0 = no);
Republican (1 = yes or 0 = no)). Similarly, I created another dummy variable that measured the party control of the Congress by chamber (Chamber
Control (House - Democrat (1 = yes or 0 = no); Republican (1 = yes or 0 =
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Adapted from Policy Agendas Project, 2014.

Figure 3.2. Monthly Totals of Congressional Hearings on the Economy July 1954–January 2012.
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Table 3.4. Senate Banking Committee Chairmen Differentiated
by Political Affiliation and History.
Banking
Committee
1953–1954

Extracted from the Biographical Directory of the US Congress
Republican Party
Homer E. Capehart (1897–1979)
Republican Party (IN) 1945–1963

1955–1959

J. William Fulbright (1905–1995)
Democratic Party (AR) 1945–1974
A. Willis Robertson (1887–1971)
Democratic Party (VA) 1946–1966
John J. Sparkman (1899–1985)
Democratic Party (AL) 1946–1979
William Proxmire (1915-2005)
Democratic Party (WI) 1957–1989

1959–1966
1967–1974
1975–1980
1981–1986

Jake Garn (1932–)
Republican Party (UT) 1974–1993

1987–1988

William Proxmire (1915–2005)
Democratic Party (WI) 1957–1989
Donald W. Riegle, Jr. (1938–)
Democratic Party (MI) 1976–1995

1989–1994
1995–1998
1999–2001

Alfonse M. D’Amato (1937–)
Republican Party (NY) 1981–1999
Phil Gramm (1942–)
Republican Party (TX) 1985–2002

2001–2002
2003–2006
2007–2010
2011–2014

Democratic Party

Paul S. Sarbanes (1933–)
Democratic Party (MD) 1977–2007
Richard C. Shelby (1934–)
Republican Party (AL) 1987–
Christopher J. Dodd (1944–)
Democratic Party (CT) 1981–2011
Timothy P. Johnson (1946–)
Democratic Party (SD) 1997–2014

Adapted from Senate Banking Committee Official Website, 2014.

no)) and (Senate - Democrat (1 = yes or 0 = no); Republican (1 = yes or 0
= no))). To better represent the effect of party on the changes in the FFR, I
created two dummy variables that measure changes in party control (Change
in Party Leadership (Senate - 1 = yes or 0 = no) and (House - 1 = yes or 0 =
no)). I also included a dummy variable that measured the presence of divided
government (1 = president and Congress are a different party; 0 = president
and Congress are same party).
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Economic Indicators (M3)
There are specific economic indicators that are essential to understanding
the health of the economy: unemployment rate, inflation rate, and the gross
domestic product (GDP). These data are available on the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. They are monthly and quarterly data. This is crucial for economic
policymaking for many reasons. For the third model (M3), I coded the unemployment rate each month (3.4 to 10.8), the inflation rate each month (–2.1
to 14.8), and the quarterly GDP Rate (2332.4 to 13506.4). Political actors,
particularly presidents and members of Congress, behave differently during
times of recession (Hoffman and Howard, 2010; Wood, 2007; Dolan, Frendreis, and Tatalovich, 2008). To account for this in the model, I created a
dummy variable that measures the presence of a recession (1 = yes or 0 = no).
Control Variables
The seven hypotheses presented above are the primary justifications for the
analysis; however, consideration of how presidential political party plays
into the Federal Reserve’s economic behavior, how the presidents’ approval
ratings play a role, the extent to which the presidential calls for legislation
affect the behavior of the Federal Reserve will also offer insight into the
Fed’s attention to congressional party leadership. Given the lack of previous
research on these control variables, this analysis investigated the influence
of presidential rhetoric, congressional attention, and economic conditions in
the context of these factors.
Dependent Variable
The Federal Reserve is an independent agency that has substantive influence
over monetary policy (Morris, 2000). The changes it makes to the Federal
Funds Rate are indicative of changes in the overall economy, which is why
the FFR was chosen as one measure of the economic behavior of the Fed
(Beck, 1982). I obtained the Federal Funds Rate from the Federal Reserve’s
Statistical Release website from July 1954 through January 2012, as illustrated by figure 3.3. There was no reason to code the FFR as it is already presented in a time-series (monthly) format. The FFR is conveyed in percentages from 0.07 percent to 19.1 each month. The rate does not change every
month. There are times when the FFR is the same from month to month.
The Federal Reserve Board is under no obligation to change the FFR from
month to month. Changing the interest rates or keeping those rates constant
is their prerogative.
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Figure 3.3. Federal Funds Rate from July 1954–January 2012.
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Effect of Presidential Rhetoric on the Federal Funds Rate
The first model (M1) is completely in-line with the hypotheses; the positive
or negative rhetoric and the control variables in this analysis do not significantly shape the Federal Reserve’s decision to change the FFR consistently
over time and in the aggregate. Moreover, the R-Squared and the Adjusted
R-Squared values indicate that the model is seriously lacking; the use of presidential rhetoric is not a complete picture of what motivates the economic
behavior of the Federal Reserve. To express this, the regression took the form
FFRi,t = α + γPresidential Rhetorici,t + ßˆ1 Presidential Partyi,t + ßˆ2 Presidential
Approval Rating + êi,t (M1)

This regression enabled me to test the argument that the president’s position
as the foremost economic leader allows for the use of rhetoric as a mechanism of presidential power that can influence the behavior of economic actors. The specification controls for the FFRi,t, wherein the i represents each
individual rate determined by the Fed in each period t (month). Therefore, I
regressed the FFRi,t on the rhetoric of the presidents, a vector of different expressions of presidential speeches (ßˆ1 Positive Ratio i, (t – 1) + (t – 2) + ßˆ2 Negative
Ratio i, (t – 1) + (t – 2) + ßˆ3 Number of Positive Statementsi,t + ßˆ4 Number of Negative
Statementsi,t + ßˆ5 Number of Speechesi,t + ßˆ6 Calls for Legislationi,t) as well as
two control variables signifying aspects of presidential power, namely, party
identification and presidential approval ratings.
Table 3.5 presents the coefficients, standard errors, semirobust standard
errors,3 and p-values as well as the measures of fit for the Prais-Winston Regression Analysis. In hypothesis one, I found that the data require a rejection
of the null hypothesis. It is not significantly more likely that the estimates
of the ratio of positive economic rhetoric have any influence on the Fed’s
economic behavior with regard to the FFR. Moreover, the number of positive statements had no substantive effect on the FFR either. The data suggest
that the Fed either responded to the president’s positive economic rhetoric
by leaving the FFR where it was or the Fed lowered it, as the alternative
hypothesis stated.
The results suggest that the tone, particularly a positive tone, is the not
the best measure of classification for presidential rhetoric and its effect on
the economic behavior of the Federal Reserve. As illustrated by figure 3.4,
there are peaks of presidential positivity regarding the economy; these peaks
typically correlate with times of economic prosperity, as measured by standard economic indicators of the economy’s health (Dolan, Frendreis, and
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Table 3.5. Prais-Winston Regression Estimates of Presidential
Economic Rhetoric on the FFR.
Dependent Variable: FFR (Monthly)
July 1954–January 2012
N = 568
(M1) Rho = 0.9829

Ratio Positive Statements
Ratio Negative Statements
Positive Lag 1
Positive Lag 2
Negative Lag 1
Negative Lag 2
Number Positive Statements
Number Negative Statements
Number of Speeches
Calls for Legislation
Presidential Approval Rating
Presidential Party

Coefficients

Standard
Errors

SemiRobust
Standard
Errors

p Values

0.0183
0.1838
–0.0327
0.0671
0.1190
0.0576
–0.0069
–0.0213
0.0019
–0.0161
0.0005
–0.1659

0.0897
0.1166
0.0888
0.0762
0.1023
0.0920
0.0246
0.0382
0.0030
0.0302
0.0055
0.2462

0.0650
0.2144
0.0634
0.0609
0.1692
0.1181
0.0171
0.0487
0.0031
0.0205
0.0061
0.1500

0.839
0.116
0.713
0.379
0.245
0.533
0.779
0.577
0.531
0.595
0.927
0.501

F (12, 555) – Statistic = 0.52 (p = 0.9024)
Adjusted R – Squared = –0.0103

R – Squared = 0.0111
MSE = 0.63963

Tatalovich, 2008). Despite concentrated efforts by presidents to use toned
rhetoric to shape behavior, the tone does not adequately engender a response
to their entrepreneurial agenda. The results suggest, rather, that the Federal
Reserve is responsive to other conditions more so than the notion that they
are attentive to the presidential cues regarding the direction the economy
should go in the future.
In hypothesis two, I also found that the data require a rejection of the
null hypothesis. It is not significantly more likely that the negative economic
rhetoric substantively influences the Fed’s economic behavior with regard to
the Federal Funds Rate (FFR). The changes that did transpire in the FFR are
statistically indecipherable from no change; it is important to note, however,
that the p-value was 0.116. The data suggest that the Fed either responded
to the president’s aggregated, negative economic rhetoric by leaving the FFR
where it was or the Fed raised the FFR, as the alternative hypothesis stated.
As illustrated by figure 3.5, the negative rhetoric encompasses only 30
percent of the total statements on the economy. The role the presidents play
in economic discussions is a difficult balancing act; presidents do not want to
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Adapted from American Presidency Project, 2014.

Figure 3.4. Monthly Totals of Presidential Positivity July 1954–January 2012.
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Monthly Totals of Presidential Negativity July 1954–January 2012.

Adapted from American Presidency Project, 2014.

Figure 3.5.
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bring too much attention to the flailing economy with their negative rhetoric. They run the risk of an electoral backlash wherein the public blames
them for the state of the economy (Vavreck, 2009). This reality might
somewhat factor into the presidential strategy of discussing the economy
positively most of the time. Nearly 55 percent of their economic rhetoric is
positive; it is a redirection of sorts (Arthur and Woods, 2013).
The data suggest that classifying presidential economic rhetoric in terms
of negativity is not the most effective approach for ascertaining the influence
presidents have over economic actors either; this type of rhetoric is used too
infrequently to garner a significant influence. The impetus for changes in
the FFR seems to be influenced by other conditions rather than toned presidential rhetoric. I must note, however, that the more negative speeches the
president gives, there is a about a five percent negative change in the FFR.
The second model (M2) is also completely in line with the hypotheses;
congressional actions and party control provide an appropriate measure of
influence on the changes to the FFR. To express this, the regression took
the form
FFRi,t = α + γMember Party Affiliationi,t + γCongressional Attentioni,t + ßˆ1
Presidential Partyi,t + ßˆ2 Divided Governmenti,t + êi,t

This regression enabled me to test the argument that the Federal Reserve is
more responsive to congressional party affiliations, party changes, and their
attention to the economy rather than presidential rhetoric and influence.
Again, the specification controls for the FFRi,t, wherein the i represents each
individual rate determined by the Fed in each period t (month). Again, we
regress the FFRi,t on member party affiliations, a vector of various representations of the importance of party (ßˆ1 Party Sen. Banking Committee Chairi,
+ ßˆ2 Party Change Senate i, t + ßˆ3 Party Change House i, t + ßˆ4 Party Control
t
Housei, t) and another vector of congressional attention (ßˆ1 Days of Congressional Hearingsi, t + ßˆ2 Days of Senate Banking Comm. Hearingsi, t) as well as
two control variables: divided government and presidential party.
Table 3.6 presents the coefficients, standard errors, semirobust standard
errors, and p-values as well as the measures of fit for the Prais-Winston
Regression Analysis. Congressional actions and party control provide a better mechanism for assessing the economic behavior of the Federal Reserve.
In hypothesis three, the data suggest that the Chairperson of the Senate
Banking Committee (SBC) has a substantive influence with the economic
decision-making of the Federal Reserve. As presented by table 3.6, the Fed is
significantly more likely to raise the FFR when the chairman of the Senate
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Table 3.6. Prais-Winston Regression Estimates of Congressional
Economic Behavior on the FFR.
Dependent Variable: FFR (Monthly)
July 1954–January 2012
N = 550
(M2) Rho = 0.9772

Sen. Bank Comm. Chair Party
Days Congress Hearings
Sen. Bank Comm. Hearings
Senate Party Change
House Party Change
Party Control in House
Divided Government
Presidential Party

Coefficients

Standard
Errors

SemiRobust
Standard
Errors

p Values

1.514
–0.0019
0.0274
0.9869
–1.521
–1.504
0.9574
0.0348

.2535
.0030
.0164
.1921
.3734
.5013
.2072
.2420

0.8031*
0.0040
0.0220
0.5458*
0.6855**
0.8357*
0.4602**
0.2090

0.0000
0.5280
0.0960
0.0000
0.0000
0.0030
0.0000
0.8860

F (8, 541) – Statistic = 8.77 (p = 0.0000)
Adjusted R – Squared = 0.1017

R – Squared = 0.1148
MSE = 0.61316

*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05

Banking Committee is a Republican, indicating that the Fed pays attention
to the party ideology in Congress regarding the economy. In this instance,
the Fed pursued a contractionary monetary policy (higher interest rates)
more so when a Republican was the chairman of the SBC.
In hypothesis four, I measured the effect of congressional hearings in two
different ways—number of days of hearings on the economy and number of
days of hearings in the Senate Banking Committee regarding monetary policy. The statistical effect of the overall number of hearings on the economy
indicates that the more hearings on the economy Congress has the more
likely the Fed would lower the FFR; the effect, however, was not distinguishable from zero. The hearings in the Senate Banking Committee did have a
measurable effect, however; it was only at the 0.10 alpha level. The more
hearings on the economy the SBC has the more likely the Fed raised the FFR.
To further measure the effects of Congress on the changes in the FFR, I
assessed when each chamber had a change in the majority party. As seen in
table 3.6, party changes in Congress had a substantive impact on the Fed’s
economic behavior. For instance, when a party change occurred in the Senate, the FFR increased substantially and when a party change occurred in the
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House, the FFR decreased substantially. One could speculate that the Fed
is aware of the significance and magnitude of a particular party going from
the minority party with constrained influence to the majority party, who
possesses the ability to intervene in the Fed’s organization, mission, and existence. Regardless of what caused the changes in the chambers, these results
suggest that that Fed responds to these changes. Moreover, as seen earlier,
the Fed responds to the party ideology of the respective majority party.
The results here indicate that the Federal Reserve is attentive to Congress
when considering whether to change the FFR. At the very least, the Fed considers factors such as the majority party in congressional leadership, political
ideology, and political climate when choosing a particular course of action
regarding monetary policy.
The third model (M3) is partly in-line with the hypotheses; the economic
indicators mostly provide an appropriate estimate of the Fed’s economic behavior. To express this, the regression took the form
FFRi,t = α + γEconomic Indicatorsi,t + ßˆ1 Presence of a Recessioni,t + êi,t

This regression enabled me to test the argument that the Federal Reserve
is more responsive to the conditions related to the economy rather than
presidential rhetoric and influence. Again, the specification controls for the
FFRi,t, wherein the i represents each individual rate determined by the Fed in
each period t (month). Again, we regress the FFRi,t on the economic conditions, a vector of various economic indicators (ßˆ1 Unemployment Rate i, t + ßˆ2
Inflation Rate i, t + ßˆ3 Gross Domestic Product i, t) as well as a control variable,
the presence of a recession. Table 3.7 presents the coefficients, standard errors, semirobust standard errors, and p-values as well as the measures of fit for
the Prais-Winston Regression Analysis. Economic indicators provide a better
indicator for changes in the FFR than presidential rhetoric does.
In hypothesis five, I measured the effect of GDP on the FFR. The Fed
raised the FFR as the GDP went down indicating that the direction in the
hypothesis was correct. The result was indecipherable from zero, as was the
dummy variable measuring the presence of a recession. As expected, in hypotheses six and seven, the unemployment rate and the inflation rate, seem
to be profoundly instrumental in the Fed’s decision to change the FFR, as
illustrated by table 3.7. In each decision that the Fed makes, whether to raise
or lower the FFR, there is a significant result for unemployment and inflation. Particularly, as the unemployment rate decreases, the Fed raises the
FFR, an indicator that the economy is getting better. These data suggest that
the Fed is most likely responding to the economic indicators rather than the
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Table 3.7. Prais-Winston Regression Estimates of Pertinent
Economic Indicators on the FFR.
Dependent Variable: FFR (Monthly)
July 1954–January 2012
N = 550
(M3) Rho = 0.9787

Unemployment Rate
Inflation Rate
Gross Domestic Product
Recession

Coefficients

Standard
Errors

SemiRobust
Standard
Errors

–0.6450
0.1836
–0.0002
0.0351

0.1253
0.0584
0.0003
0.1509

0.1874**
0.0761*
0.0002
0.0984

F (4, 545) – Statistic = 9.70 (p = 0.0000)
Adjusted R – Squared = 0.0596

p Values
0.000
0.002
0.524
0.816

R – Squared = 0.0665
MSE = 0.6273

*p < 0.05
**p < 0.001

rhetoric from the president, which makes sense given their legal obligation
and concern with inflation and unemployment (Edwards and Wood, 1999).
Therefore, one might speculate that if the economy is getting better, the Fed
is more likely to raise the FFR as a result of those healthful indicators rather
than the positive rhetoric from the president, which is most likely a result of
the positive economy.

Conclusion
The Fed is responsible for regulating inflation by altering interest rates on
monies loaned to banks. Their ability to change the Federal Funds Rate
has a substantial impact on the economy (Frumkin, 2004). Because of the
Fed’s role in the economy, presidential administrations are highly concerned
with this bureaucratic organization; the decisions the Fed employs can make
the achievement of other economic policy goals difficult. Yet, there is no
consensus or substantive discussion in the literature as to the ability of the
president to effectively use rhetoric, cues, and signals to shape the economic
behavior of one of the most substantial economic actors—the Federal Reserve. However, extent research indicates that political actors respond and
produce cues as a mechanism of political behavior and persuasion (Yates and
Whitford, 2005; Eshbaugh-Soha, 2006; Edwards and Wood, 1999; Light,
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1999). Therefore, this analysis sought an answer as to whether presidents
try to shape the Fed with rhetorical cues and the extent to which they are
successful.
There is a literature that argues that presidential rhetoric is able to motivate certain economic actors by signaling their tone, their political position, and their level of commitment (Wood, 2007; Eshbaugh-Soha, 2006).
However, that literature, specifically, glosses over the externalities that
potentially affect the changes in the economy, the constraints of the separated system of American government, and the limitations inherent in the
president’s ability to use rhetoric to achieve desired results. My analysis has
allowed for a more comprehensive research operationalization rather than arguing that the president’s ability to change economic indicators comes from
his position as the most important economic actor in the system (Wood,
2007; Eshbaugh-Soha, 2007). By expanding the data sources and the audience of pertinent economic actors, I offered a more comprehensive assessment of presidential influence with economic actors and the results suggests
that previous research might not be the definitive word on the presidential
influence (Wood, 2007).
These results have further contributed to the extant literature by ascertaining that the president does intend to cue or signal the Fed about which
direction he wants monetary policy to go in the future. Further, it determines
that the president, through the use of positive and negative economic rhetoric, is not overly successful in shaping the Fed’s economic behavior, as seen
in the changes to the Federal Funds Rate. This analysis does confirm what
others have stated, namely, that presidents have increased their rhetoric on
the economy significantly (Wood, 2007). However, my research suggests
that the increased rhetoric and attention to the economy has not brought
about the desired effects for which presidents advocate. The changes in the
FFR were not statistically significant and could not be recognized from zero.
Moreover, when considering the Fed’s claim of independence from politics,
it is unlikely that they would risk congressional intervention and changes to
their organization because they did the bidding of a sitting president. Secondly, the Fed is unlikely to help a sitting president in an election year; the
Fed’s intervention in an election may harm the organization more so than
any political capital it may gain by meddling (Beck, 1982). Therefore, it is
more likely that the economic behavior of the Federal Reserve is shaped by
congressional party affiliations, party changes, and their attention to the
economy as well as economic indicators rather than the cues and signals the
president sends to the Fed.
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The results actually provided three specific components that show the extent to which the Federal Reserve pays attention to the presidents’ rhetoric,
congressional actions, and indicators of the economy’s strength. Conducting
the analysis in this manner provided a picture of how the presidents discuss
the economy in their speeches, particularly with regard to the tone. These
results suggest that the Fed did not respond to the rhetorical cues and signals;
the rhetorical assessment of the economy does not shape how the Federal
Reserve reacts to presidential assessments of the economy. The presidential
rhetoric did not have a substantive effect on the raising or lowering of the
FFR because of the tone within speeches (positive/negative). Such an understanding provides insight into presidential influence over economic actors and the economy; it is clear that the lack of significance in presidential
rhetoric’s ability to predict changes in the Federal Funds Rate is telling from
a “rhetoric as mechanism of influence” perspective. Despite presidential attempts to tailor their rhetoric to influence specific actors, they are incredibly
unsuccessful, in nearly every way.

Notes
1. Regressing the FFR on every variable in all three models was not substantively
different than creating three models. It made more sense, theoretically, to differentiate the models.
2. I must attach a word of caution about some of my hypothesis. Publishing
null hypotheses is difficult. However, it is not unprecedented when warranted.
Many scholars have done this. Not all of the hypotheses in the entire book take
the “null hypothesis” approach, however. Those that do are warranted. However,
I must argue that this analysis, based upon the theory and its response to the extant literature, warrants the “null hypothesis” approach. Therefore, if there is no
effect, I am correct; there is no consideration of the magnitude by which rhetoric
affects the FFR. I was not interested in magnitude, but rather the president’s ability
to influence the decision making of an economic actor with the tone present in
the rhetoric. I assume that my alternative hypothesis is correct until I could find
evidence that it was incorrect. No such evidence could be found in this instance.
I set up the analysis this way on purpose. I know that it makes it easier to obtain
and justify my results. I think that the analysis still warrants a contribution to the
literature. I took multiple measures to ensure that I gave presidential rhetoric a
chance to make an impact. I differentiated the rhetoric by the tone of the speech,
the type of speech as well as the time-period; it was not a simple aggregation of
words. However, one could still read the results with caution because the rhetoric
used was a stratified random sample and not the complete analysis of every word
every president spoke.
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3. The Semi Robust Standard Errors were included in the Tables to simply indicate the changes that the Cochrane–Orcutt estimation made to the standard errors
in the Prais-Winston Regression Analysis. The significance of each variable was not
changed substantively. However, I have indicated the changes in alpha levels, which
were noteworthy.
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